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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN MARDESICH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.

ANTHONY BROS. CONSTRUCTION, a
Utah corporation, dba ANTHONY BROS.
POOL & SPA; SUN HILL HOMES, L.C.,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

Case No: 20150730
District Court No. 080502342

Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Issue on Appeal No. 1: Did District Court Judge G. Michael Westfall commit error

by granting an Order vacating the March 17, 2014 Judgment holding that "Judge Shumate
made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would be responsible to
ensure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool."?
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard, however, legal standards are reviewed for
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correctness and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT
17, ,I9, 311 P.3d 995.
Citation to Record:

1689-1696 (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New

Trial), 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich pp. 44-54)

~

Issue on Appeal No. 2: Did the District Court err when it vacated the March 17,
2014 Judgment holding that "there does not appear to be reasonable basis for finding that
Sun Hill had a contractual duty under the REPC to investigate the soil's suitability for a
swimming pool."?
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed

<t.

under an abuse of discretion standard, however, legal standards are reviewed for
correctness and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT
17, ,I9, 311 P.3d 995.
Citation to Record: 1689-1696 (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New
Trial), 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich pp. 44-54)
Issue on Appeal No. 3: Whether the District Court erred by vacating the March
17, 2014 Judgment?
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, however, legal standards are reviewed for
correctness and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT
17, ,I9, 311 P.3d 995.
Citation to Record: 1689-1696 (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New
Trial), 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich pp. 44-54)
2
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Issue on Appeal No. 3: Whether the District Court erred by awarding attorney
fees to Sun Hill L.C.?
Standard of Review: A trial court's award for attorney fees is reviewed under a
correctness standard. "Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of
law, which we review for correctness. Likewise, whether the trial court's findings of fact in
support of an award of fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,315 (Utah 1998).

Citation to Record: 1939-1943 (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New
Trial), 2046 (Transcript of June 29, 2015 hearing).
CONTROLLING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Utah R. Civ. P. 59.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This Appeal arises from a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) entered into
between Plaintiffs John and Marie Mardesich and Sun Hill Homes. In December of2004
the parties entered into the REPC and construction of the home on the lot began pursuant to
the plans and specifications provided by Sun Hill. After entering into the REPC but prior
to closing, the grading for the Lot was significantly changed. After completion of the
Home, Plaintiffs hired Anthony Bros. to construction a swimming pool on the altered Lot.
After its construction the swimming pool experienced significant differential settlement
resulting in the pool being out of level by more than one inch and the spa being out of level
by as much as two inches. Plaintiffs filed suit and after a two day trial, Judge Shumate
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ruled that Sun Hill breached the REPC in its modified form, and entered an judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant Sun Hill sought a new trial, which was granted by Judge
Westfall after Judge Shumate retired. Judge Westfall also granted Sun Hill a judgment for
attorney fees.

Course of Proceedings
This Appeal arises from an Order Granting a New Trial issued by Judge G. Michael
Westfall on October 17, 2014 and the Judgment entered by Judge G. Michael Westfall on
July 16, 2015. Judge Westfall granted a new trial and amended the judgment issues by
Judge James L. Shumate on March 17, 2014 holding that there was no finding that the
parties mutually agreed that Sun Hill would construct the lot in such a fashion that the soil
was suitable for the construction of a swimming pool, and holding that "there does not
appear to be a reasonable basis for finding that Sun Hill had a contractual duty under the
REPC to investigate the soil's suitability for a swimming pool.'~ Additionally, the Appeal
arises from the July 16, 2015 judgment for in favor of Sun Hill for attorney fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sun Hill was the developer and promoter of certain properties within the

Sunbrook Communities, located in Washington County, Utah. Record 95-106 (Amended
Complaint ,16), 112 (Sun Hill Answer ,I4 ).
2.

On or about July 31, 2003, Rosenberg Associates provided a Geotechnical

Investigation for Sun Hill Homes for the property that would come to be known as the
Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands at Sunbrook, the subdivision
where Plaintiffs' Lot 8 is located. Record 2047 (Exhibit 24), 1598 (Judgment, Findings,
4
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Conclusions and Judgment, if2).
3.

In addition to the Geotechnical Investigation, Rosenberg Associates

prepared a Grading Plan for the Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands
at Sunbrook, the subdivision where Plaintiffs' Lot 8 is located. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 21 ),
1598 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if3).
4.

Prior to entering into the REPC, Sun Hill retained Applied Geotechnical

Engineering Consultants, Inc., (hereinafter "AGEC") to perform various tests and
evaluations on Lots 1-3 and 5-17 in the Woodlands Subdivision, which resulted in a
September 21, 2004 AGEC Geotechnical Investigation. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 16), 1598
(Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if4 ).
5.

On or about December 4, 2004, Plaintiff entered into a Real Estate

Purchase Contract for Construction (hereinafter "REPC") with Sun Hill with regard to the
property which is the subject of this litigation (hereinafter "Property" or ''Lot 8"). Record
204 7 (Exhibit 1), 1598 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if5).
6.

The REPC, dated November 16, 2004, was signed by Marie Mardesich,

who was defined in the REPC as "Buyer". Record 204 7 (Exhibit 1), 1598 (Judgment,
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if6).
7.

John and Marie Mardesich signed twelve (12) addenda to the REPC from

September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006.

Record 204 7 (Exhibit 1), 1598 (Judgment,

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if7).

8.

On or about May 16, 2006, Plaintiff and Sun Hill "closed" on the sale of

the Property and Sun Hill conveyed the Property to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant by
5
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Special Warranty Deed (hereinafter "Warranty Deed") which was recorded on or about
June 6, 2006.

Record 2043 (page 18), 1598 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and

Judgment, if 8).
9.

After the property had been deeded to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant

by Sun Hill on June 6, 2006, Plaintiff hired Anthony Bros. to construct a pool in the
backyard of Lot 8 at the Woodlands.

Record 2047 (Exhibit 31), 1599 (Judgment,

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ,rI 0 - 11 ).
10.

Plaintiff never had a contract with Sun Hill for Sun Hill to construct the

Pool. Record 1598 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ,r11 ).
11.

Sun Hill did not construct the Pool and the Pool was constructed at the

Property after Plaintiff accepted title to the Property. Record 1599 (Judgment, Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment, if 12).
12.

Defendant Anthony Bros. Construction applied for and received a

building permit for the Pool from the City of St. George on or about September 1, 2006.
Record 1599 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ifl3).
13.

Anthony Bros. dug and excavated the hole for the Pool before

commencing the construction or the installation of the Pool. Record 1599 (Judgment,
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if 14).
14.

The pool and spa experienced significant differential settlement after

construction. Record 1599 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ,r15).
15.

The industry standard and construction of swimming pools and spas is a

one inch differential in elevation from one side of the pool or spa to the other. Record
6
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2043 (Testimony of James Nordquist p. 198), 1599 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment, ,r21 ),
16.

The swimming pool at the Mardesich home is out of level by approximate

1.2 inches, and has the potential for additional movement. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 27 p.
10), 1599 - 1600 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if22),
17.

The spa is clearly out of the one inch standard and has a differential

elevation of 1.9 inches. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 27 p. 10), 1600 (Judgment, Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment, ,r23).
18.

At the time Lot 8 was subdivided, it was prepared and graded according to

the grading plan prepared by Rosenberg Associates. Record 2043 (Testimony of John
Mardesich p. 51:12-22), 2044 (Testimony of Jason Rogers p.13:3-11), 1600 (Judgment,
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, 127).
19.

As originally graded the entire flat portion of the backyard area of Lot 8

was within the 25 foot building limits line and within the area over excavated and
compacted to 90 percent compaction. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 27, p.8, figure 2, and figure
3).
20.

The compaction requirements for the fill slopes shall extend out to the

slope face. Record 204 7 (Exhibit 27, Rosenberg 2003 geotechnical investigation, p.14 ).
21.

As originally constructed the level portion of Lot 8 was approximately 30

feet from the lot line closest to the river. Record 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich p.
42:12-15).

7
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22.

After entering into the REPC but prior closing and the transfer of Lot 8 to

Plaintiffs, the grading of Lot 8 changed substantially. Record 2043 (Testimony of John
Mardesich p. 42:12-15), 2044 (Testimony of Jason Rodgers p.32:8-21)
As a result of the changes made by NRSC and accepted by Sun Hill the

23.

flat portion of Lot 8 was substantially increased and every linear foot of soil added to Lot 8
required that approximately 27 yards of soil be added to Lot 8. Record 2044 (Testimony
of Jason Rodgers p.40:20-25, 41: 1-8), 1600 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment, if30).
The changes to the Lot 8 including the addition of soil occurred while Lot

24.

8 was under the control of Sun Hill Homes. Record 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich,
44:11-25, 45:1-24), 2047 (Exhibits 4 and 6), 1600 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment, ~32).
25. After the placement of the soil while under Sun Hill's control the distance
between the lot line and the level portion of the lot was approximately 9 feet. Record 2043
(Testimony of John Mardesich p. 42:12-15).
26.

In discussion with Sun Hill, it was discussed and determined that the flat

building surface of Lot 8 would be enlarged. Record 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich
p. 45: 1-9).
27.

Plaintiffs had discussions with Mr. Stratford regarding the intention to

change the swimming pool plans as they "now had a larger area that we could place the
pool on . . ."

Record 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich p. 52:25 - 53:1-6), 1601

(Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if35).
8
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28.

Pursuant to conversations between Mr. Mardesich and Sun Hill's agent,

Mr. Roger Stratford, it was agreed and understood that the level portion of the back yard

area was increased and that the entire level portion of the backyard area was able to be used
as buildable area. Record 2043 (Testimony of John Mardesich p. 54:17-21).
29.

Sun Hill presented no evidence to dispute the testimony of Mr. Mardesich

that the Parties agreed and understood that the additional soil would be able to be used as a
buildable area. Record 2043 and 2044.
30.

After the enlargement of the flat building surface of the lot, portions of

said surface were outside the 25 foot building area and were not compacted to 90 percent.
.,!J)

)

Record 204 7 (Exhibit 2 7) .
31.

Properly compacted site grading fill should be compacted to on the order

of 90 to 95 percent of the maximum dry density as determined by ASTM D-1557 to
properly support the pool and spa..." Record 2047(Exhibit 27, Appendix A).
32.

At no time did Defendant Sun Hill prepare, obtain, or submit to the City

an amended grading plan, accordingly the grading to Lot 8, as transferred to Plaintiffs was
without the review and approval of engineers or the City. Record 2043 (Testimony of
John Mardesich p. 52:11-16).
30.

Despite this failure to obtain approval or a new grading plan, the flat

building surface of Lot 8 was enlarged.

Record 2044 (Testimony of Jason Rodgers

p.40:20-25, 41:1-8), 1600 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, if30).

9
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31.

Defendant Sun Hill Homes was aware, through its agents, Roseanne

Campbell and Roger Stratford of Plaintiffs' intention to build a swimming pool in the
backyard of Lot 8.
32.

While the original plans for the swimming pool had contemplated an

infinity pool, to be constructed within the construction envelope of the original grading
plan for Lot 8, the additional soil added to Lot 8 while under the control of Sun Hill Homes
resulted in changed plans for the swimming pool. Record 2043 (Testimony of John
Mardesich p. 52:25 - 53: 1-6), 204 7 (Exhibit 27, Appendix B and C), 1601 (Judgment,
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ,I35).
33.

The decision to change the style of the swimming pool built was a result

of the changed grading of Lot 8 and was reasonable. Record 2043 (Testimony of John
Mardesich p. 52:25 - 53:1-6), 2047 (Exhibit 27, Appendix B and C), 1601 (Judgment,
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, il35).
34.

After the change in grading to Lot 8, Sun Hill Homes took no action to

investigate the effect the changed grading had on the suitability of the Lot for the
construction of a swimming pool. 1601 (Judgment, Findings, Conclusions and Judgment,
il36).
35.

Judge Westfall admitted that reasonable minds could differ, stating "This

is one of those difficult situations where obviously minds can differ. I'd like to think that
reasonable minds can differ because Judge Shumate saw it one way and then something - it came back to before me, and I've had the opportunity to look at, and frankly, I didn't see
it the same way that he did and I issued my decision." Record 2046, at 11:7-12.
10
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The District Court sitting for the Motion for a New Trial amended the original Trial
Court's findings in two specific areas, first, that Sun Hill breached the REPC by failing to
provide soil suitable for the construction of backyard improvements, and second, that Sun
Hill failed to investigate the additional soil added to the lot for its suitability for the
building of improvements.

In overturning the original trial Judge, the District Court

focused on the terms of the original REPC and failed to acknowledge that the terms of the
REPC had been significantly altered by agreement of the Parties.

The trial Court

improperly granted the Motion for a new trial and amended the judgment.
On each of the above issues, Sun Hill failed to meet its burden of marshalling the
evidence to show that the evidence supporting the judgment was completely lacking or so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable. Because Sun Hill
failed to properly marshal and dispute the evidence presented at trial, the District Court
erred in granting the motion for a new trial and amending the judgment. Without a finding
by the trial court that Sun Hill properly marshalled the evidence and that the evidence
supporting the Trial Court's findings was so lacking as to be unreasonable, the trial court
improperly granted a new trial and vacated the judgment.
Additionally, the Co_urt erred by ruling that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to uphold the finding that the parties mutually agreed that Sun Hill would
provide the additional soil in such a condition that it would be suitable for the construction
of a swimming pool, or that under the amended REPC Sun Hill had at least the obligation
to investigate the suitability of the soil for the construction of a swimming pool. Finally,
11
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the court improperly awarded attorney fees to Sun Hill, despite Sun Hill's breach of the
REPC.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
a. In Order to Grant a New Trial, the Moving Party Must Marshal the
Evidence and Demonstrate that such Evidence is so Lacking as to make
the Judgment Plainly Unreasonable.

Rule 59(a)(6) states that a new trial may be granted due to "insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." In addition, Rule
59(a)(7) provides for a new trial based on "error in law." Regardless of the grounds

~

claimed for a new trial, a verdict which is the subject of a motion for a new trial will be
reversed only if the evidence supporting it was completely lacking or so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. See Commercial
Investment v. Saggard, 936 P .2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Not only should the court only grant a new trial if the evidence is completely lacking
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust "the moving party has the burden of
marshalling all the evidence supporting the verdict and then showing that the evidence
cannot support the verdict.'~ Id. at 1109. Sun Hill's argument for a new trial on either
grounds of insufficiency of evidence or error of law, are the same. Sun Hill asserts that
the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a modification of the REPC.
Accordingly, Defendant Sun Hill had the obligation to marshal all of the evidence in
support of the original judgment and then show that the evidence cannot support said
verdict. To explain the magnitude of what Sun Hill was required to do in order for the
12
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Gt.,,

Court to grant a new trial, the Utah Court of Appeals identified what is necessary to
marshal the evidence, stating that "simply listing evidence for and against its position" is
insufficient to meet the burden of marshalling the evidence. The Utah Court of Appeals
identified the burden stating:
The marshalling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshalling the evidence, the challenger must present in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the party resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence. Harris v. JES Assoc., Inc., UT App. 112 139, 69
P.3d 297.
Once the moving party has identified and presented every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the verdict and identified the fatal flaw in said evidence,
the moving party must establish that the flaw is sufficient to convince the court that the
prior court findings resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. See, Id.
The District court erred in granting a new trial, Sun Hill failed to appropriately
marshal the evidence as required. The District Court, after a detailed analysis of the
parole evidence rule stated "Plaintiffs argument, however, fails to account for the fact that
Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would
be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool." First, the District
Court applied the improper standard. The standard required for granting a new trial is not
whether Judge Shumate sitting as trial judge made such a finding but is whether after
reviewing all of the evidence to support the judgment, the evidence is so lacking that the
judgment is plainly unreasonable. See Commercial Investment v. Saggard, 936 P .2d 1105
13
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(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The unopposed testimony of Mr. Mardesich is that he had multiple discussions with
Sun Hill's representative, Mr. Roger Stratford, in which it was understood that Lot 8 would
not be and was not constructed according to Sun Hill's grading plan, that the grading of Lot

~

8 was altered while under Sun Hills' s control and that the Mardesichs would alter their
swimming pool plan to utilize the additional building area in the backyard. Record 2043.

It was further understood that the entire portion of the yard would be able to be used as a
buildable area for improvements, specifically a swimming pool.

Record 2043.

The

geotechnical report also recommended that ''imported, non-expansive fill or blended

~

on-site materials placed at the site should equal or exceed at least 90% compaction.
Record 2047, Exhibit 27. Compaction to 90% was what was required to comply with the
engineering requirements of the subdivision and also the level of compaction required for
the construction of a swimming pool. Record 204 7, Exhibit 31.
At no time in connection with the Motion for a new trial did Sun Hill present the

<iL.,.i

above facts and then demonstrate the fatal flaw in said evidence. Therefore, not only did
Sun Hill fail to properly marshal the evidence, Sun Hill failed to present any evidence at
trial to contradict the testimony of Mr. Mardesich that the parties agreed to change the
grading plan and that the additional soil placed on Lot 8 was suitable for building
improvements. Because Sun Hill completely ignored the evidence supporting the Trial
Court's Judgment and findings that the Parties agreed to a modification of the contract
which altered the Lot grading and required the soil added be suitable for the building of
improvements, the Court erred in granting a new trial and the Order granting a new trial
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<L,

should be reversed.
The District Court in granting the Motion for New Trial not only failed to require
Sun Hill to properly challenge the Trial Court's findings and judgment, it also completely
ignored the evidence supporting the original judgment. The uncontroverted evidence
presented at trial was that Sun Hill and Mardesich agreed that the grading of Lot 8 would
be altered and that the additional backyard area would be suitable for building
improvements of which construction of a swimming pool is one and the one both parties
knew to be the intended use. In its Order granting the Motion for New Trial and Vacating
the Judgment, the District Court neglected to even address whether Sun Hill marshalled the
evidence. Primarily, the Court's order is silent regarding the evidence presented at trial
and unopposed by Sun Hill, establishing that Sun Hill originally constructed Lot 8 in
accordance with the grading plan, but that the grading of Lot 8 was changed and that it was
discussed and understood that the newly added soil to Lot 8 was suitable for building,
much the same as the buildable area of Lot 8 prior to the changes in grading.
Not only did Sun Hill fail to establish that the evidence supporting the judgment
entered by Judge Shumate was so lacking as to make the judgment unreasonable, Judge
Westfall affirmatively stated this particular case was a difficult situation and that
reasonable minds could differ. Because an order granting a new trial requires that the
evidence be so lacking that the judgment must be "unreasonable," by Judge Westfall's own
admission the grounds necessary to grant a new trial have not been met. Pursuant to Judge
Westfall, reasonable minds could differ as to the sufficiency of the evidence and in such a
situation a motion for a new trial should be denied. Therefore, it was an error to grant the
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motion for a new trial and this Court should reverse the order granting a new trial and
reinstate Judge Shumate original findings and judgment.

b. The Evidence Presented at Trial Reasonably Supports a Finding that
Sun Hill Agreed to Provide Soil Suitable for the Construction of
Backyard Improvements.
The District Court further erred, by finding that the parties had orally agreed to alter
the grading of Lot 8, but held that the same evidence was "so lacking" that a finding that
the parties had altered the agreement regarding the soil in the backyard was unreasonable.
Not only did the District Court not require Sun Hill to meet the proper burden to grant a
new trial, the District Court accepted some of the evidence to support the Trial Court's

Et-:

Findings and Judgment, but disregarded other evidence without so much as an explanation
as to why the evidence was such as to make portions of the original Trial Court's findings
reasonable and other findings unreasonable.
In order to have arrived at the District Court's Order granting a new trial and
vacating the judgment, the District Court must have reviewed the testimony of Mr.
Mardesich regarding the agreement to alter the grading of Lot 8 and held it to be sufficient
to uphold Judge Shumate~ s determination that the REPC was properly altered, while at the
same time reviewing the testimony of Mr. Mardesich that the modifications to the REPC
included an understanding that the soil added would be suitable for the building of
improvements and held that such testimony was not only different from the testimony
regarding the changes to the grading, but that the testimony was so lacking as to make the
judgment unreasonable.

While Appellants could understand a finding that the evidence

was insufficient to justify any changes to the REPC, the District Court's ruling that the
16
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evidence was sufficient to modify one provision of the REPC but not another, without a
clear explanation of the grounds for such a finding is error.
The District Court held that "the circumstances clearly changed in 2005, and
although the parties' expectations clearly changed regarding the size of Plaintiffs'
backyard, there does not appear to be any reasonable basis for finding that Sun Hill had a
contractual duty under the REPC to investigate the soil's suitability for a swimming pool,
particularly when Section 14 of the REPC expressly allocates to Plaintiffs the
responsibility for proper engineering of improvements involving excavation, which would
include an improvement such as the swimming pool here." Order at 8. Therefore, by
necessity the Court ruled that the REPC was altered in 2005, as the REPC requires that Sun

Hill construct the Property "in substantial conformity with Seller's Standard Plans and
Specifications as of the time of Start of Construction." REPC at Section 7. As the Home,
which includes the Lot and Improvements, was not constructed according to the Plans and
Specifications, therefore, the Court must have ruled that the REPC was altered. 1

If the REPC was altered, as was found by the initial Trial Judge, and confirmed by
the District Court in its Order for a New Trial, there must have been a meeting of the minds.
"A valid modification of a contract requires a meeting of the minds of the parties which
must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness." Westmont
Residential LLCv. Buttars, 2014 UT App 291, ,i1s, 340 P.3d 183. Therefore, the District
Court in its Order for a new trial, found the evidence that the parties had agreed to an
1

Sun Hill argues that they have the ability to alter the plans pursuant to Section 12 of the REPC, however, the plans
for Lot 8 were never altered and as Section 12 is specific to Seller's ability to alter the "plans" not the execution of the
those plans, the parties must have reached an agreement to modify the REPC.
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alteration of the backyard of Lot 8 reasonable, but held the evidence that said agreement
included an understanding that the additional soil placed at Lot 8 would be suitable for
building of improvements, including a swimming pool was unreasonable. Such a finding
is inconsistent. The evidence to support the findings that the REPC was altered as to the

~

grading of Lot 8 is the same evidence that such alteration including that the additional soil
placed on Lot 8 would be suitable for the building of improvements, the uncontested
testimony of John Mardesich. Trial 52-54. The finding that the additional soil used to
extend the level portion of the backyard would be suitable for the construction of backyard
improvements is also supported by the fact that the level portion of the backyard prior to
the alterations had been over excavated and compacted.
Because a meeting of the minds is essential to a court finding that the modification of
the REPC was reasonable, if there were no meeting of the minds as to the elements of the
modification, additional soil suitable for the building of improvements, the District Court
must find that there was no modification and that Sun Hill breached the terms of the REPC
by failing to build the Property according to the only grading plan ever created. However,
the District Court did not vacate the Trial Judge's findings that the REPC had been
modified, but instead accepted the unopposed testimony of John Mardesich as sufficient to
uphold the modification of the grading plan, but insufficient to uphold that there was a
meeting of the minds that the additional soil provided would be suitable for the building of
improvements. Such a ruling is error because the suitability of the additional soil for the
building of improvements was a material element to the modification of the REPC. Either
there was a meeting of the minds that the grading plan would be changed and the additional
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soil would be suitable for the building of improvements, much like the soil placed within
the building limits area of the grading plan, or there was not meeting of the minds and Sun
Hill breached the REPC by failing to construct the Lot according to the grading plan it
created. Either way the District Court's order granting a new trial and vacating the
judgment is in error.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT SUN HILL HAD A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE THE SUITABILITY
OF THE ADDITIONAL SOIL.
a. Sun Hill Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the Finding that Sun
Hill had a Duty to Investigate the Suitability of the Additional Soil for
Backyard Improvements.
As stated above, the District Court upheld the vast majority of the Trial Court's

findings but granted a new trial and vacated the judgment on the grounds that Sun Hill had
no duty to provide suitable soil or investigate to determine the suitability of the soil.
Regardless of the grounds claimed for a new trial, a verdict which is the subject of a motion
for a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence supporting it was completely lacking or
so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. See

Commercial Investment v. Saggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Not only
should the court allow a new trial if the evidence is completely lacking as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust "the moving party has the burden of marshalling all
the evidence supporting the verdict and then showing that the evidence cannot support the
verdict."

Id. at 1109.

Accordingly, Defendant Sun Hill also had the obligation to

marshal all of the evidence supporting the finding that Sun Hill had a duty to investigate the
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soil for its suitability for the building of improvements.

Once the moving party has

identified and presented every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the verdict and identified the fatal flaw in said evidence, the moving party must
establish that the flaw is sufficient to convince the court that the prior court findings resting

( .••.

'-''

upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. Harris v. JES Assoc., Inc., UT App. 1 I2 ,r39, 69
P.3d 297.
QL.,.·

The District court erred in granting a new trial on the issue of Sun Hill's duty to
investigate the suitability of the soil for it's agreed upon purpose, the building of
improvements. Sun Hill failed to appropriately marshal the evidence as required. The

~.•

District Court stated "Thus the court agrees that the Judgment should be amended to
correct the legal error that occurred when a contract duty was imposed on Sun Hill to
investigate the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool." The District Court however,
failed to address and discount evidence relating to the modification of the REPC.
(L,

The following evidence supported a finding that Sun Hill had a duty to either provide
suitable soil, or at the least investigate the soil to determine its suitability for its agreed
intended purpose. John Mardesich testified that after multiple discussions with Sun Hill
regarding the changed grading of Lot 8, that it was his understanding, based on his
communications with Sun Hill, "that the entire level portion of the yard would be able to be
used as buildable area for backyard improvements." Record 2043. Sun Hill failed to
identify and address and dispute the evidence that the authorized agent of Sun Hill had
represented that the back yard area would be able to be used as a buildable area.

Sun Hill

also failed to identify and discount the evidence that the original buildable area of the
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Property was over excavated and compacted making it suitable for the building of
improvements. Sun Hill further failed to discount the obligation in the REPC to construct
the property "in substantial conformity with the Seller's Standard Plans and Specifications
as of the time of Start of Construction" which required that the placement of fill be
compacted to 90%.

Therefore, Sun Hill failed to properly identify and discount the

evidence which placed the burden on Sun Hill to at the very least investigate whether the
soil was placed according to the standard plans and specifications. The evidence also
supports the finding that by agreeing that the additional soil area added to the Property was
suitable for the building of improvements, Sun Hill agreed that the additional soil would be
placed in accordance with the requirements of AGEC's engineering report, or at least 90%
compaction. In order to achieve such an obligation, Sun Hill would have needed to
investigate the suitability of said soil for the building of improvements.
The unopposed evidence presented at trial was that the Mardesichs and Sun Hill
agreed to a change in the grading of the Property and by doing so agreed that the additional
soil would be suitable for the building of improvements, due to that change, the evidence is
sufficient to establish a contractual duty that Sun Hill investigate the suitability of the soil
for such a purpose.
As with the evidence supporting a finding that Sun Hill had a duty, Sun Hill failed to
establish that the evidence supporting the finding that Sun Hill had a duty to investigate the
soil entered by Judge Shumate was so lacking as to make the judgment unreasonable, and
Judge Westfall acknowledge that reasonable minds could differ on the sufficiency of the
evidence, stating "[t]his is one of those difficult situations where obviously minds can
21
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differ.

I'd like to think that reasonable minds can differ."

In a situation where

determining the sufficiency of the evidence is difficult and that reasonable minds could
differ, a motion for a new trial is inappropriate. Because an order granting a new trial
requires that the evidence be so lacking that the judgment must be "unreasonable," by

Gv·

Judge Westfall' s own admission the grounds necessary to grant a new trial have not been
met. Pursuant to Judge Westfall, reasonable minds could differ as to the sufficiency of the
evidence and in such a situation a motion for a new trial should be denied. Therefore, it
was an error to grant the motion for a new trial and this Court should reverse the order
granting a new trial and reinstate Judge Shumate original findings and judgment.
b. The Evidence at Trial Demonstrated a Meeting of the Minds Regarding
Sun Hill's Duty to at Least Investigate the Suitability of the Additional
Soils.

While the District Court in its order for a new trial accepted the testimony evidence
of John Mardesich to support the finding that the parties had altered the agreement
regarding the amount of soil in the backyard and the grading of Lot 8, the Court held that,
that same evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the parties agreed that the
additional soil would be suitable for the building of improvements.
The District Court held that ""the circumstances clearly changed m 2005, and
although the parties' expectations clearly changed regarding the size of Plaintiffs'
backyard, there does not appear to be any reasonable basis for finding that Sun Hill had a
contractual duty under the REPC to investigate the soil's suitability for a swimming pool,
particularly when Section 14 of the REPC expressly allocates to Plaintiffs the
responsibility for proper engineering of improvements involving excavation, which would
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include an improvement such as the swimming pool here." Order at 8. Therefore, by
necessity the Court ruled that the REPC was altered in 2005, as the REPC defines the
"Home" as the Lot and improvements and further requires that Sun Hill construct the
Home "in substantial conformity with Seller's Standard Plans and Specifications as of the
time of Start of Construction." Record 2047, Exhibit 1.

Because the Home, more

particularly the Lot, was not constructed according to the Plans and Specifications, the
Court must have ruled that the REPC was altered. 2
If the REPC was altered, as was found by the initial Trial Judge, and confirmed by

the District Court in its Order for a New Trial, there must have been a meeting of the minds
as to terms of the modification. "A valid modification of a contract requires a meeting of
the minds of the parties which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness." Westmont Residential LLC v. Buttars, 2014 UT App 291, ~15,
340 P .3d 183. The District Court in its Order for a new trial, found the evidence of a
meeting of the minds sufficient to uphold Judge Shumate's ruling that the contracted for
expectations of Parties had been altered, but held the evidence supporting a finding that the
Parties had agreed that the nev.·ly added soil would be suitable for the building of
improvements to be so lacking that a finding that it was the mutual understanding of the
parties that the soil would be suitable for the building of improvements to be unreasonable.
It is impossible to hold that the sole evidence presented at trial regarding the agreement of

the parties was sufficient to alter one term of the contract but not another. It would be

Sun Hill argues that they have the ability to alter the plans pursuant to Section 12 of the REPC, however, the plans
for Lot 8 were never altered. What was altered was the REPC requirement that the property be constructed according
to the plans. Therefore, the parties must have reached an agreement as to the construction of Lot 8.

2
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completely different if Sun Hill had presented any evidence to support the agreement to
modify the grading of Lot 8 but which opposed the testimony that the additional soil would
be suitable for the building of improvements, however, Sun Hill presented no such
evidence. Therefore, the only evidence of a modification of the REPC was the testimony
of John Mardesich which the Court accepted as sufficient to support the finding that the
REPC was altered, while in the same breath stating that it was so lacking as to make the
determination that the meeting of the minds included an understanding that the soil would
be suitable for the building of improvements unreasonable. For the District Court to
uphold the one finding and strike down the other is error and should be overturned.

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF FIRST BREACH PREVENTS SUN HILL FROM
RECOVERING ATTORNEY FEES.
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated, and it is undisputed, that Sun Hill did

not construct Lot 8 in substantial conformity with Seller· s Plans and Specifications as
required by Section 7 of the REPC. In fact, Sun Hill did not construct Lot 8 in accordance
with any plans and specifications.

While the Mardesich's argue that the evidence

presented at trial is sufficient to establish a modification of the REPC.

Sun Hill has

vigorously argued that there was no modification of the REPC. If the Amended Judgment
is affirmed then there was no modification of the REPC and Sun Hill was obligated to
construct Lot 8 in accordance with the Plans and Specifications, prepared by Sun Hill, for
Lot 8, primarily the Grading Plan. By not constructing Lot 8 according to the grading
plan, Sun Hill breached the REPC.
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"We have explained that under the "first breach" rule a party first guilty of a
substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the other party
thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the
other party nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent
failure to perform." CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ,I29, 116 P.3d 366.
Because Sun Hill was the first to breach the terms of the REPC, Sun Hill cannot
insist on Plaintiffs' performance of the terms of the REPC, primarily the payment of
attorney fees. It stands to reason that if Sun Hill is prohibited from maintaining an action
to recover for a subsequent breach, Sun Hill is similarly prohibited from seeking recovery
of attorney fees allowed by the REPC which Sun Hill breached.
The evidence presented at trial was that there was a modification of the contract,
particularly that the soil placed on the property would increase, and that the soil would be
suitable for the building of improvements, if the District Courts finding without any
contrary evidence that this was not the agreement of the parties is in error. However, if the
Court were to determine that no modification of the contract occurred as alleged at trial by
Sun Hill, Sun Hill breached the REPC by failing to properly build the Home according to
the grading plan and was the first to breach the agreement.
Utah Courts have recognized the possibility of a situation where "neither side
prevailed completely." Westmont Mirador LLC, v. Shurtliff, 2014 UT App 184, ,Il2, 333
P.3d 369. The court may refuse to award attorney fees to either party. In the present case
it is undisputed that Sun Hill breached the REPC by failing to construct Lot 8 in accordance
with the Plans and Specifications, unless the court finds, like the original Trial Court that
the REPC was altered, at which point the Court should reverse the District Court's order
granting a new trial and amending the judgment. If this Court affirms the District Court's
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order that the REPC was not altered, the evidence at trial demonstrates that, Plaintiffs were
not entitled to recovery from Sun Hill and Sun Hill breached the REPC by failing to
construct Lot 8 as required by the grading plan; accordingly, neither party is entitled to the
recovery of attorney fees. Sun Hill is prohibited from recovering attorney fees because

~

Sun Hill committed the first breach of the REPC and is therefore prohibited from forcing
Plaintiffs to comply with the other terms of the REPC, specifically the payment of attorney
fees. In the event that the Court affirms the Order Granting a New Trial, the Court must
by necessity reverse the order granting attorney fees to Sun Hill.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Mardesich are entitled to have Sun Hill meet the burden
placed upon Sun Hill to overturn the Trial Judge's decision. That burden is to identify all
of the evidence supporting the original judgment and then explain it away, Sun Hill did not
meet this burden. Sun Hill ignored testimony that the parties modified the REPC by
agreement, in no small part because there was no evidence to oppose the testimony that
such an agreement was reached. In addition, even if Sun Hill had properly identified and
refuted the evidence, the evidence presented at trial that the Parties modified the REPC to
change the grading of the Property with the addition of approximately 27 cubic yards per
linear foot, and that the soil added, much like the soil in the original construction of the Lot
would be suitable for the construction of improvements, primarily a swimming pool is not
so lacking as to make such a finding unreasonable. Judge Shumate's ruling, after hearing
all of the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, is supported by the
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evidence presented at trial, and the order granting a new trial, amended judgment, and
J

judgment in favor of Sun Hill for attorney fees should be reversed.

?:('" day of March, 2016.
DATED this ~.2~JENSENBA YLES,

LLP

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief of Appellant contains
5,040 words, based on the word count of the word processing system used to prepare the
brief exclusive of the table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum containing

v

statutes, rules, regulations or portions of the record, and therefore complies with the
type-volume limitation set forth in Utah R. App. P. 24(t)(l

t_,

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

j/Sr day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a copy

of foregoing document, on the parties listed below as follows:
Party(ies) Served
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230

Method of Service
IX! Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Electronic File
D Email
D Fax (Person agreed to service by
fax.)
~ Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Fax (Person agreed to service by
fax.)
D Email (agreed to service by email.)
D Electronic File

Attorney for Defendant
Adame. Dunn
Clifford V. Dunn
110 West Tabernacle
P.O.Box2318
St. George, UT 84770

PARALEGAL

29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

